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Book review

Adolescence in lifespan perspective
Laurence Steinberg, Age of opportunity: Lessons from the
new science of adolescence. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt,
Boston, 2014, ISBN: 978-0-544-27977-3 (cloth), 264 pp.,
$28

Adolescence, argues Laurence Steinberg in Age of opportunity, is the
new zero-to-three. Noting the extensive publicity regarding evidence
of the developmental plasticity of the very young brain, Steinberg
writes, “We now know that adolescence is a similarly remarkable period of brain reorganization and plasticity” (p. 22).
As indicated in the subtitle, the book’s intent is to provide “lessons
from the new science of adolescence.” What is the new science of adolescence? Brain science. And what are its lessons? The primary lesson is that brain plasticity decreases after the first few years of life
but then returns to a high level in adolescence, which Steinberg defines as the period fromabout age 10 (reflecting the declining age of
puberty) to about age 25 (reflecting recent delays in the United States
and elsewhere in adopting adult roles). He claims that “psychological change during adolescence is far more dramatic than it is in middle childhood” (p. 41).
The second half of the book focuses on applying what we know
to promote adolescentwelfare and development. I have argued elsewhere against the sorts of categorical restrictions Steinberg and others
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believe can be justified by brain immaturity (Moshman, 2011b, 2013).
Steinberg’s recommendations to parents of adolescents, on the other
hand, seem beyond question: We should focus on rewarding, rather
than punishing, behavior.We should promote development by scaffolding advanced behavior. We should engage in authoritative, rather
than authoritarian or permissive, parenting. And all of this should be
directed toward promoting the development of self-regulation. These
recommendations are hardly new insights, however, nor are they specific to adolescence. On the contrary, they reflect a professional consensus rooted in decades of psychological theory and research on
learning, cognition, and development.
In this review, considering Age of opportunity as popularization,
I provide some historical context regarding popular nativism. Then,
turning to academic considerations, I consider the place of Steinberg’s
theory of heightened adolescent plasticity in relation to other developmental views of the lifespan.

Popular nativism
Over the course of the 20th century, developmental psychology cameto
be dominated in turn by empiricist conceptions (the behaviorist and
other learning theories that ruled from the 1930s through the 1950s),
then by constructivism (beginning with the rediscovery of Piaget in
the 1960s), and finally by nativism (beginning with the neonativist
infancy research of the 1980s). Nearly all 21st century developmentalists subscribe to theories that incorporate nativist, empiricist, and
constructivist considerations, but most, even when they deny it, prioritize one or two of these factors.
At the turn of the present century, three of the leading proponents
of neo-nativism, agreeing that their conception of developmentwas
ready for prime time, collaborated on a popular account of what they
took to be the extraordinary scientific competencies of infants. The
scientist in the crib (Gopnik, Meltzoff, & Kuhl, 2001) was followed by
The philosophical baby (Gopnik, 2009), an ode to “truth, love, and the
meaning of life” as revealed in the minds of infants. Reviewing the latter work as a sequel to the former, I wrote in this Journal:
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The philosophical baby is aimed at a general audience, especially parents, and is readable, informative, entertaining, and
oftenamusing. Like its predecessor, the book presents itself
as passing on the latest findings from developmental psychology. It does indeed present interesting findings in clear
and compelling ways.What will not be clear to the intended
readers, however, is that what they are reading, rather than
a consensus view of the field, is a neonativist interpretation
(Moshman, 2011a, p. 44).
All the same can be said of Steinberg’s Age of opportunity, which
might be seen as extending the series to adolescence. This book too is
readable and informative. Widely recognized as a major scholar of adolescence, Steinberg is not quite as entertaining or amusing as Gopnik,
but he has his moments. My favorite is a footnote in which he recalls:
When a reporter once asked my opinion of a California prosecutor’s initial decision in 1996 to charge a six-year-old with
attempted murder, I said that perhaps he was trying to send
a message to first graders all over the country. (p. 189).
Steinberg sometimes appeals to empiricism in making the case that
parents and schools can and should promote development. He appeals
to the constructivist emphasis on agency in his focus on self-regulation. But his overall nativism is clear throughout. Parents are seen as
input into a maturational process that is deemed strongly related to
age. Self-regulation, in particular, is presented as the outcome of a
maturational process that culminates in the mid-20s in a state of mature self-regulatory ability. Psychological development is conceived as
a process of brain maturation in which various brain systems reach
states of maturity at predictable ages in childhood and beyond up to
the achievement of fullmaturity around age 25. In his words, “Different regions of the brain develop along different timetables, and as
a result, different abilities reach adult levels of maturity at different
ages” (p. 200).
Consistent with this nativist approach, Steinberg’s explanations of
complex psychological and social phenomena are cheerfully reductionist. For example: “Why does the mere presence of friends make
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teenagers take more chances? We found the answer inside the adolescent’s brain” (p. 95). Much of the argument, moreover, relies uncritically on animal data: “Adolescents get a dopamine squirt frombeing with their friends, just as they do fromother things thatmake
themfeel good. It’s true in adolescent rodents as well as human adolescents” (p. 98).
Adolescent rodents? Granted, evolutionary and comparative perspectives are crucial to understanding mammalian puberty. Adolescence, however, as a period of life that extends for years beyond
puberty, is a cultural phenomenon of modern human societies (Moshman, 2011b, 2013). In the traditional societies for which evolution has
prepared us (and our brains), individuals in their teens were expected
to function at mature levels as members of their social groups. Given
that evolution proceeds over thousands of generations, it is difficult
to see how “adolescent” rodents or the evolution of the brain relate
to the rapidly expanding adolescence associated with human cultural
changes of the past 150 years.
But Steinberg is ready to proclaim “lessons from the new science of
adolescence”: “We should devote fewer resources to trying to change
how adolescents think, and focus instead on limiting opportunities for
their inherently immature judgment to hurt them or others” (p. 105).
That is, “Some things just take time to develop, and mature judgment
is one of them. While our kids are maturing, we must protect them
from themselves” (p. 106).
By “kids,” of course, Steinberg means adolescents, and by adolescents he means people up to about age 25. In the tradition of Gopnik,
what Steinberg has provided for the public is “a kinder, gentler nativism” (Moshman, 2011a). His maturational conception of development,
however, posits a much later point of maturity than do standard neonativists and most other developmental theorists, and is used to justify
an extended period of parental and societal protection and restriction.

Patterns of developmental change
A major feature of Steinberg’s approach to adolescence is looking
at adolescence in lifespan perspective. Developmental research and
theory rest on diverse assumptions about the lifespan pattern of
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developmental change. Steinberg, who is far from a standard neonativist, can be seen as proposing an alternative to four current viewpoints concerning the pattern of development across the lifespan.
In standard neonativism, the first view, development is primarily a
phenomenon of infancy and early childhood. Changes in later childhood and beyond are mostly a matter of learning and largely specific
to particular experiences and cultural contexts. Development in this
view is a genetically guided maturational process leading in just a few
years in any normal human environment to universal states of maturity (Gopnik, 2009; Gopnik et al., 2001).
Second, in the standard child development view, development takes
place across childhood and perhaps early adolescence. Changes beyond
early adolescence are mostly a matter of learning and largely specific to particular experiences and cultural contexts. Developmentalists who take this view see extensive evidence for age-related progress
beyond the preschool years toward universal states of maturity generally achieved by early adolescence (e.g., Miller, 2012; Pillow, 2012).
The third view shares with the standard child development view a
vision of development across childhood but, in amove toward a lifespan perspective, see greater possibilities for extended development
through the teen years and beyond (Moshman, 2011b, 2015). Development becomesmore variable in rate and pluralist in direction after
childhood but often continues at least through early adulthood in at
least some contexts. Development here still refers to changes that are
extended, self-regulated, qualitative, and progressive. Developmental
changes beyond childhood are not inevitable, however, and do not result in universally achieved states of maturity.
Finally, lifespan developmentalists argue that development ismultidirectional and occurs across the entire lifespan, further undermining notions of universality and maturity. Development is construed to
refer broadly to changes that are extended and self-regulated even if
they are not qualitative or progressive.
Steinberg proposes what can be considered a fifth view: extended
adolescence as the new zero-to-three. In this view, adolescence, which
he sees as roughly the period from age 10 to 25 years, is the second
major period of developmental plasticity, following the plasticity of
the first three years.
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Periods of heightened brain plasticity are times when our
experiences are likely to have enduring effects. We have
known for some time that the first few years of life constitute
one such period. We now know that adolescence is another.
(p. 217).
Thus Steinberg sees the lifespan in four stages: a stage of infancy
involving major developmental change, a stage of relative stasis from
about age 3 to 10 years, another stage of major developmental change
from about age 10 years through the mid-20s, and then an adult stage
of relative stasis. In contrast to standard neo-nativism he believes
there is later development. In contrast to the standard child development view, he sees middle childhood as relatively unimportant compared to what precedes and follows it. In contrast to the extended development view, he sees adolescence as a biologically distinct stage of
progress toward a universally achieved state of adult maturity. And in
contrast to lifespan conceptions, he believes there is a sharp decline
in the mid-20s in the potential for developmental change.
Steinberg’s analysis is a helpful contribution for those already
aware of the theoretical alternatives and prepared to think critically.
As with Gopnik (2009; Gopnik et al., 2001), however, this is not the
“lessons” from a “new science” that it claims to be.
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